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The justification for a majority of international judges sitting on hybrid 
international criminal tribunals is tremendously undertheorized. At present, 
policymakers must rely on base pragmatic considerations that allege that local 
judges are either too incapable or too corrupt. This may or may not be true – it 
is however, certainly unattractive and inadequate as an argument. In this paper, 
I sketch out a principled theoretical argument defending internationalization of 
hybrid tribunals. Drawing on debates in municipal jurisdictions on the 
principle of fair reflection, my principled justification centres on institutional 
and sociological legitimacy. As international crimes strike at two societies – 
the local and the global – hybrid tribunals should be composed of both 
international and local judges. In principle, the severity of international crimes 
dictates that international judges should predominate. However, peculiar 
contextual factors may suggest moderating the principle of fair reflection in 
appropriate circumstances.   
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A curious development is underway in international criminal law—the return of the hybrid 
international criminal tribunal. At the turn of the twenty-first century, six hybrid courts were 
established in countries transitioning from mass atrocity or reeling from international crimes. 
Considered uniquely tailored to the peculiar features of the crimes they were designed to 
handle, proponents of these courts argued that they offered the potential for a catalytic 
transition to normalcy, based on a tri-partite grounding of legitimacy, capacity building and 
norm-penetration.1 Unfortunately however, despite the best intentions and some limited 
successes, these courts largely failed to achieve their considerable (and perhaps unrealisable) 
promise. Their popularity declined dramatically and no further hybrid courts were 
established—that is, until last year. 
  
On 3 June 2015, Catherine Samba-Panza, interim President of the Central African Republic 
(CAR), promulgated a law establishing a 'Special Criminal Court' to try all war crimes and 
crimes against humanity committed in the CAR since 2003.2 Two months later, on 3 August 
2015, Kosovo lawmakers enacted legislation establishing a 'Specialist Chambers' comprised 
of international judges to try members of the Kosovo Liberation Army accused of atrocities 
against Serbs, Roma and Kosovar Albanians.3 Elsewhere, the United Nations Mission in 
																																								 																				
1 L. Dickinson, ‘The Promise of Hybrid Courts’, (2003) 97 AJIL 295, 306.  
2 G. Mattioli-Zeltne, ‘Taking Justice to a New Level: The Special Criminal Court in the Central African 
Republic’, Human Rights Watch (13 July 2015) https://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2015/07/13/taking-justice-new-level-special-criminal-court-central-african-republic. 
3 Republika e Kosovës, Law No,05/L-053 On Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920058 
South Sudan has recommended a special or hybrid court be considered in order to 'pursue 
genuine accountability' of perpetrators involved in a civil war that has raged since December 
2013;4 a coalition of 146 national and international NGOs have called upon the government 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to establish a 'Specialised Mixed 
Chambers';5 and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
recommended the establishment of a 'hybrid special court' to address systemic human rights 
violations in Sri Lanka.6 After a period of dormancy, it appears that hybrid criminal tribunals 
have returned as a viable option in international criminal justice. 
 
This should not come as a surprise. Despite a range of teething problems concerning design 
and implementation, for many in the international criminal justice field, hybrid tribunals still 
hold significant promise.7 Yet, in large part this is not due to the successes of previous hybrid 
tribunals, but rather the uncertain state of international criminal justice more broadly. Indeed, 
today, international criminal justice appears to be suffering a crisis of legitimacy:8 the slow 
collapse of the case against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta;9 the African Union’s push to 
guarantee immunity for sitting heads of state;10 and South Africa and Namibia’s moves to 
withdraw from the International Criminal Court 11 are just three stark illustrations of the 
current dilemma. If international criminal justice is to be resuscitated, this new generation of 
hybrid courts must be more successful than their previous incarnations. If we are to avoid the 
mistakes of the past, it is crucial that these new hybrid courts are not simply constructed as 
sui-generis ‘expedient stopgaps’,12 or (even worse) copied without thought. The design of the 
CAR Special Criminal Court, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, and the proposed courts in 
South Sudan, the DRC and Sri Lanka should be based on extensive evaluation of the failings 
of the previous hybrid courts.  
 
This paper adds to the literature examining and evaluating the first iteration of hybrid 
tribunals with the aim of systemic development for this new generation of hybrid courts. It 
does so by analysing an area often taken for granted, but absolutely critical in ensuring 
successful functional operation of all courts—the composition of the Bench. Since the 
emergence of hybrid tribunals, scholars have attempted to corral these heterogeneous 
institutions in order to define their common features. Despite some diversity of opinion 
																																								 																				
4 United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report (8 
May 2014), Recommendation 5 [312]. 
5 Democratic Republic of Congo: No More Delays for Justice – Establish Specialized Mixed Chambers and 
Adopt ICC Implementing Legislation During the Current Parliamentary System (1 April, 2014). 
6 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka, 14 July – 2 October 2015’ (16 
September 2015), Recommendation 20 at 250, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/CRP.2.  
7 United Nations, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for 
Post-Conflict States: Maximizing the Legacy of Hybrid Courts (2008). 
8 D. Luban, ‘After the Honeymoon: Reflections on the Current State of International Criminal Justice’ (2013) 11 
JICJ 505.  
9 Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on the withdrawal of charges against Mr Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-
02/11, T.Ch V(B), 13 March 2015. See further S. Mueller, ‘Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): 
Politics, the Election and the Law’ (2014) 8 Journal of East African Studies 25. 
10 Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 (Oct 
2013) [10]  
11 African National Congress, National Governing Council 2015 Resolutions on International Relations, 
Recommendation 2.9; Shinovene Immanuel, ‘Cabinet affirms ICC withdrawal’, The Namibian, 24 November 
2015 http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?page=read&id=34394; ‘Ndaitwah clarifies Namibia’s withdrawal 
from ICC’, New Era, 11 March 2016 https://www.newera.com.na/2016/03/11/ndaitwah-clarifies-namibias-
withdrawal-icc/.  
12 P. McAuliffe, ‘Hybrid Tribunals at Ten: How International Criminal Justice’s Golden Child Became an 
Orphan’ (2011) 7 Journal of International Law and International Relations 1, 7. 
around the edges, it is recognised that the mixed composition of local and international 
judges is a defining characteristic of these tribunals.13 While there is growing scholarship on 
international judges,14 few scholars have focused specifically on the composition of hybrid 
criminal tribunals,15 and there has been little attention to providing a principled justification 
for mixed composition.  
 
On the primary question of whether the majority of the Bench should be composed of local or 
international judges, competing justifications can be proffered. A majority of local judges can 
enhance the legitimacy of the court in the affected state. It may weaken the (often valid) 
critique that international criminal law is simply imperialism by another name, by enabling 
the national authorities to take a leading role in the trial of their own war criminals. In doing 
so the international community provides moral backing for the local judiciary, implicitly 
recognizing that they are not biased, corrupt or incapable. At the same time, a minority of 
international judges can complement their local counterparts in both subtle and unsubtle 
ways; for example, through informal conversations and deliberations in chambers, and in 
reasoned decisions in open court. However, as the experience of the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has demonstrated, in societies transitioning from mass 
atrocity with devastated judicial institutions, a majority of local judges can have significant 
negative consequences. Credible allegations of bias, political interference and corruption 
have bedevilled the ECCC, suggesting that this approach must be managed carefully. 
 
But a focus on the experience in Cambodia is liable to miss the real issue. What about states 
where the judiciary’s independence is not compromised? Should a majority of international 
judges be preferred ipso facto? A principled justification for internationalization must instead 
focus on the particular characteristic of international crimes. Drawing on debates in domestic 
jurisdictions on the link between the principle of “fair reflection” and institutional 
sociological legitimacy, I provide a principled justification for the mixed composition of 
hybrid courts.  
 
Legitimacy can be understood as the ‘quality that leads people (or states) to accept 
authority—independent of coercion, self-interest, or rational persuasion—because of a 
general sense that the authority is justified’.16 Thus, legitimacy has normative and 
sociological dimensions: a hybrid court may be normatively legitimate because it was 
established by municipal law after agreement between a state and the United Nations,17 and it 
																																								 																				
13 S. Nouwen, ‘“Hybrid courts”: The Hybrid Category of a New Type of International Crimes Courts’ (2006) 2 
Utrecht Law Review 190, 213; S. Williams, Hybrid and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals (2012), 204; E. 
Higonnet, ‘Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform’ (2006) 23 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 347, 356. 
14 R. Mackenzie, et al, Selecting International Judges: Principles, Process and Politics (2010); D. Terris, C. 
Romano and L. Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the 
World’s Cases (2007). 
15 The only significant examination is C. Romano, ‘The Judges and Prosecutors of Internationalized Criminal 
Courts and Tribunals’, in C. Romano, A. Nollkaemper and J. Kleffner (eds), Internationalized Criminal Courts: 
Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia (2010) 235-270. For a recent effort see: H Hobbs, 'Hybrid 
Tribunals and the Composition of the Court: In Search of Sociological Legitimacy' (2015) 16 Chicago Journal 
of International Law 493. 
16 D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93 AJIL 596, 600. See also T. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 
(1990), 16. 
17 See for example the ECCC: Khmer Rouge Trials, GA Res 57/228, UN GAOR 57th sess, Agenda item 109(b), 
UN Doc A/57/806 (May. 22, 2003); Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
may be sociologically legitimate because the people of the affected state accept, or perceive, 
it as justified.18 Legitimacy is particularly crucial for hybrid courts.19 As a practical matter, 
absent any police force these courts are ‘especially vulnerable to being ignored’.20 However, 
more significantly, the total breakdown of civic trust, both horizontally and vertically, that 
characterizes states transitioning from authoritarianism or mass atrocity, severely weakens 
the prospect of acceptance of authority—particularly where a sizeable number of people may 
disagree with the court’s judgment. If institutions are not considered legitimate, social 
regulation is more difficult and costly, and may be impossible in transitioning states. Without 
legitimacy, the promised benefits of hybrid courts will be lost.  
 
The general acceptance of judicial decisions as “justified” relies on public confidence, not 
simply coercion. If hybrid tribunals are to be accepted as legitimate, and are to realize their 
potential for (limited) capacity building and norm-penetration, the composition of these 
courts must be a fair reflection of the society in question. As international crimes strike at two 
societies—the local and the global—to be legitimate, both local and international judges must 
necessarily staff hybrid courts.21 However, it should be remembered that there is no 
homogenous international community, and both principled and pragmatic reasons militate in 
favour of splitting the international judges into greater particularity.22 Consideration of 
contextual factors in the appointment of international judges is critical in ensuring a clearer 
connection between the court and the primary victims.  
 
In setting out and answering the need for a principled justification, I divide the paper into two 
parts. In the first section I examine the principle of fair reflection in municipal jurisdictions, 
exploring the emergence of the principle and assessing its meaning and operation in 
comparative jurisdictions. While in the domestic context the principle has primarily been 
employed to advocate for greater gender and ethnic balance, in the international sphere the 
application of the principle turns on issues of representation of geographic and legal 
tradition.23 In this section I argue that a court’s sociological legitimacy is intimately tied to its 
composition. In the second part of the paper I examine the dualism inherent in international 
criminal law—that international crimes are violations against two societies, the local and the 
global. Drawing on the principle of fair reflection, I argue that sociological legitimacy 
demands that the composition of the courts tasked with jurisdiction over these crimes reflect 
these two societies. I argue further that in principle the severity of international crimes 
necessitates a majority of international judges on any internationalized court. This 
presumption, however, may be departed from in appropriate contexts.24 For example, in 
situations where civic trust has been decimated it may make sense to have a majority of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 
NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004). 
18 Bodansky, supra note 16, at 601. See further Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 
(1964), 382.  
19 Y. Shany, ‘How can International Criminal Courts Have a Greater Impact on National Criminal Proceedings? 
(2013) 46 Israel Law Review 431, 449-450.  
20 N. Grossman, ‘Sex Representation on the Bench and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts’ (2011) 
11 ICLR 643, 644  
21 Cf. M. Markovic, ‘International Criminal Trials and the Disqualification of Judges on the Basis of their 
Nationality’ (2014) 13 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 1. 
22 E. Bruch, ‘Hybrid Courts: Examining Hybridity Through a Post-Colonial Lens’ (2010) 28 Boston University 
International Law Journal 1, 36; Hobbs, 'Hybrid Tribunals and the Composition of the Court', supra note 15, 
493, 524-532. 
23 Mackenzie, supra note 14, at 24-25. 
24 And has been in the Central African Republic Special Criminal Court, which is composed of 27 judges, 14 
international and 13 local. 
international judges; in situations where restorative justice efforts are prioritized, a majority 
of local judges may be necessary. My aim in this paper is modest: Where hybrid courts are 
under consideration, policymakers should bear in mind that the principle of fair reflection can 
enhance sociological legitimacy, leading to greater support amongst the victim community, 
and offering greater potential for the promises of hybrid courts to be realized.  
 
 
2. The principle of fair reflection 
 
Debates concerning the composition of domestic judiciaries can inform the approach taken 
for internationalized courts. Over the last thirty years an emergent soft-law principle 
concerning the composition of the judiciary has developed. First clearly enunciated in the 
1983 Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice,25 the principle of “fair 
reflection”, has since been reaffirmed in numerous international instruments26 and 
operationalized in many domestic and international judicial appointment procedures, 
including, in part, the ICC.27 The essence of this emergent principle is neatly distilled in 
Article 2.15 of the Mt Scopus International Standards on Judicial Independence, which 
requires that ‘the process and standards of judicial selection shall give due consideration to 
ensuring a fair reflection by the judiciary of the society in all its aspects’. In short, judges 
should mirror the society over which they exercise jurisdiction. This section will examine the 
meaning and status of the principle in municipal jurisdictions, with the aim of elucidating an 
understanding that can inform the composition of hybrid courts.  
 
 
2.1. What does the principle of “fair reflection” require? 
 
Legal and political theorists have long emphasized the importance of judicial independence 
and impartiality as either a formal or procedural characteristic of the rule of law.28 For Locke, 
men come together in civil society in order to ‘avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of 
the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his own case’.29 
A formal division of powers between co-equal branches of government, as recognized by 
Montesquieu and persuasively argued for in the Federalist Papers,30 offers the clearest 
avenue for formally guaranteeing this independence. Judicial independence thus has two 
dimensions: independence from the apparatus of the state, and impartiality towards the 
parties at issue. The former institutionally secures the latter,31 and both are recognized across 
the globe as of paramount importance.32 However, if judges are to be independent and 
																																								 																				
25 Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, art 2.13. 
26 It has been expressly reaffirmed in The Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International 
Judiciary, art 2.2 (2005), and the Mt Scopus International Standards on Judicial Independence, art 2.15 (2008). 
For implicit endorsement on the basis of non-discrimination in judicial appointment see: United Nations, Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, UN Doc A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 (1985) art 10. 
27 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered 
into force 1 July 2002), art 36(8). 
28 J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’, in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (1979) 210, 
216-217.  
29 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1821) Book II Ch 7 [90]. 
30 C. de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748) (A. Cohler trans, 1989) Book XI, Ch 6, 157; The Federalist 
Nos. 47, 51 (James Madison), No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
31 W. Schabas, The UN International Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (2006), 
506. 
32 For a comprehensive account of the standards see S. Shetreet, ‘The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial 
Independence in Domestic and International Law’ (2009) 10 Chicago Journal of International Law 275. 
impartial, then how are we to speak of mirroring societal interests? Is the principle of fair 
reflection at odds with the fundamental principle of judicial impartiality?  
 
Indeed, it is important at the outset to distinguish between “reflection” and “representation”. 
Representation can be defined broadly as meaning ‘the making present in some sense of 
something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact’.33 More specifically it can be 
delineated between the concepts of “standing for” and “acting for”. The principle of judicial 
independence and impartiality leaves no room for this second form of representation: Judges 
are required to perform their duties and exercise their powers ‘honourably, faithfully, 
impartially and conscientiously’,34 to ‘do right to all manner of people according to law 
without fear of favour, affection or ill-will’,35 and should not be seen to act for, or as 
representatives of, any particular interest. Rather, the Judge is said to represent “the law” or 
“justice”. Of course, unlike the judiciary, the duty of a politician is to act ‘in the interests of 
the represented in a manner responsive to them’.36  
 
The former notion of representation, “standing for,” can be further delineated between 
symbolic and descriptive representation.37 A flag does not resemble a nation but symbolizes 
one; a map represents the physical configuration of a country drawn to scale.38 When we 
speak of ‘fair reflection’ we are talking about descriptive representation. This concept 
requires a body reflective of society:  ‘an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large’.39 
It is this descriptive notion of representation that underpins the fair reflection principle; 
though note that “fair” reflection does not require exact proportion. Conceptualized in this 
sense, the principle of fair reflection does not necessarily disturb judicial impartiality. It 
simply requires that in its composition, the judiciary should mirror society in all its 
diversity—religious, gender, geographical, social, ideological, etc.  
 
However, when framed in this broad sense the principle is open to significant criticism. At 
least in most states, the legitimacy of the judiciary is not of a political form gained through 
democratic processes but an institutional legitimacy achieved through consistent procedurally 
fair, unbiased and transparent application of norms to particular fact scenarios.40 If the sole, 
or even dominant consideration for judicial appointment were a candidate’s religious belief, 
gender, ethnicity, or ideological leaning etc. than public confidence in the judiciary would be 
significantly undermined in two important respects. First, the criteria may lead to a drop in 
the quality of appointees, leading to a drop in the quality of the court’s decisions. Second, 
particularly in the case of an ideological criterion but relevant for any criterion other than 
“merit”,41 it may taint the judiciary as simply an institution of political patronage. The 
international standards recognize this and are careful to acknowledge that the principle should 
																																								 																				
33 H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (1967), 8-9. 
34 International Court of Justice, Rules of the Court (1978) (adopted on Apr. 14, 1978 and entered into force on 
July. 1, 1978), art 4(1). 
35 High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) s. 11, schedule. Similar oaths exist in every country. 
36 Pitkin, supra note 33, at 209. Pitkin defines this as “substantive representation”. 
37 Id. at 60 & 92. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 60. 
40 M. Loth, ‘Courts in Quest for Legitimacy: A Comparative Approach’, in N. Huls et al (eds), The Legitimacy 
of Highest Courts’ Rulings: Judicial Deliberation and Beyond (2009), 267.  
41 Of course the concept of “merit” in judicial appointment is not uncontroversial: M. Thornton, ‘“Otherness” on 
the Bench: How Merit is Gendered’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 391.  
cede to issues of professional skill and qualification. Article 11.2 of the comprehensive Mt 
Scopus Standards provides:  
 
11.2 While procedures for nomination, election and appointment should consider fair 
representation of different geographic regions and the principal legal systems, as 
appropriate, as well as of female and male judges, appropriate personal and 
professional qualifications must be the overriding consideration in the nomination, 
election and appointment of judges. 
 
This mild conception of the principle subjects it to the functional and institutional necessity 
of maintaining ‘the professional quality and the moral integrity of the judiciary’.42 In doing so 
it avoids some of the more persuasive criticism. In practice, it requires that of two candidates 
with the requisite skill and qualifications, the candidate whom would enhance the 
representative character of the judiciary should be preferred.  
 
Such a policy, though not able to convince everyone, is said to guarantee not political 
legitimacy, but institutional and social legitimacy by enhancing public confidence in the 
courts.43 This occurs in two ways: first, the very presence of a ‘non-traditional’44 judge will 
lead to greater support of the institution by that identified community; and second, the 
diversity of experience, knowledge, expertise and outlook that heterogeneous judges will 
bring to the case at issue may lead to more well-rounded decisions that command greater 
support throughout the entire community.  
 
Public trust and confidence is of critical importance for the judiciary. In the Federalist No. 78 
Alexander Hamilton remarked that the judiciary has ‘neither Force nor Will, but merely 
judgment’,45 and therefore, as the European Court of Human Rights has held, ‘must enjoy 
public confidence if it is to be successful in carrying out its duties’.46 The concern is that any 
institution that fails to reflect the ‘make-up of the society from which it is drawn will sooner 
or later lose the confidence of that society’.47 Indeed, the principle of fair reflection has 
emerged in opposition to the prevailing orthodoxy of judicial appointments in numerous 
countries, which led to a ‘narrow social, ideological, or geographical background of 
judges’.48 Certainly this has been the experience in Australia,49 and other countries.50  
 
This role model rationale is intuitive but deficient for it ignores the agency of the non-
traditional judge. While a socially or culturally homogenous judiciary composed of eminently 
qualified individuals is capable of producing sound decisions, a more diverse court made up 
of equally eminently qualified and skilled individuals will likely produce better decisions.51 
Non-traditional judges can make a ‘unique and transformative contribution’ by introducing 
																																								 																				
42 S. Shetreet, ‘Who Will Judge: Reflections on the Judicial Process and Standards of Judicial Selection’ (1987) 
61 Australian Law Journal 766, 776.  
43 Ibid, 776; Shetreet, supra note 32, at 311; MacKenzie et al, supra note 14, at 171. 
44 E. Rackley, Women, Judging and the Judiciary: From Difference to Diversity (2013), 196. 
45 The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
46 Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria (1995) 313 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at [34]. 
47 S. Evans and J. Williams, ‘Appointing Australian Judges: A New Model’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 295, 
300. 
48 Shetreet, supra note 32, at 310.  
49 E. Neumann, The High Court of Australia: A Collective Portrait 1903 to 1972 (1973), 105-106. 
50 See Shetreet, supra note 32, at 310-311. 
51 On the idea that deliberation between conflicting views is the best means for discovering the truth see: J. 
Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979), 58-60. 
‘traditionally excluded perspectives and values into judicial decision-making’.52 The failure 
to incorporate diversity results in a stunted law that diminishes confidence and legitimacy in 
the institution as a whole. Barbara Hamilton has made this argument persuasively in the 
Australian context in relation to gender diversity. 
 
The absence of women judges on the Bench may compromise the community’s 
ability to accept judgments, particularly where gender issues appear relevant to the 
outcome.53 
 
The first female Justice of the Canadian Supreme Court, Justice Bertha Wilson, has made 
similar remarks. 
 
Some aspects of the criminal law in particular cry out for change because they are 
based on presuppositions about the nature of women and women’s sexuality that in 
this day and age are little short of ludicrous.54 
 
While Hamilton and Justice Wilson may have had the common law’s historical marital rape 
exemption,55 or the position of battered women syndrome56 in mind, the long struggle to 
classify rape and sexual violence as war crimes under international law,57 offers additional 
support for their view. That the breakthrough came from the targeted inquiry of Judge 
Navanethem Pillay, the sole woman on the ICTR Trial Chamber hearing the case,58 and 
sustained pressure from women’s human rights organizations, suggests as such. To our 
shame, female judges on international courts still remain the exception.59 
 
Of course it is not correct to suggest that a diverse Bench will necessarily enhance public 
confidence or that an individual (for example, female) judge will by virtue of her gender 
approach (or decide) a particular case in a distinct manner. As many have remarked, the years 
of legal education and training required of judges may have a homogenizing effect on their 
attitudes, perceptions and outlook, irrespective of gender or culture.60 This is an important 
reminder when extrapolating the principle into hybrid courts. The presence of national judges 
may not be enough in and of itself to ground legitimacy. A local judge may be from a 
particular cultural or ideological community and their presence may in fact diminish public 
confidence and legitimacy in the institution as a whole. This warning demonstrates that the 
principle of fair reflection in domestic and hybrid courts must always cede to “traditional” 
integral judicial qualities of impartiality and professional skill. Though of course “merit” 




52 S. Ifill, ‘Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence’ (2000) 57 Washington 
& Lee Law Review 405, 479. 
53 B. Hamilton, ‘Criteria for Judicial Appointment and “Merit”’ (1999) 15 QUT Law and Justice Journal 10, 18.   
54 B. Wilson, ‘Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?’ (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 507, 515. 
55 Australia: R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379; England: R v R [1991] 4 All ER 481. 
56 See in particular the judgment of Wilson J in R v Lavallee [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852.  
57 Prosecutor v Akayesu (1998), Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment [598]. 
58 R. Copelon ‘Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into International Criminal 
Law’ (2001) 46 McGill Law Journal 217, 225. 
59 Mackenzie, supra note 14, at 161-165; For statistics see N. Grossman, ‘Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges 
Matter to the Legitimacy of International Courts?’ (2012) 12 Chicago Journal of International Law 647, 652-
654, 678-681. 
60 R. Graycar, ‘The Gender of Judgments: An Introduction’ in M. Thornton (ed), Public and Private: Feminist 
Legal Debates (1996), 262, 268-269.  
2.2 Application of the principle in municipal law 
  
The mild form of the principle of fair reflection has been endorsed in a number of 
international declarations and an increasing number of states. Significantly, the principle is 
‘most commonly found in federal or multicultural countries where a reflection of the 
constituent political units or cultures is expected on the bench’.61 The growing awareness of 
the importance and legitimating qualities of the principle in these states lends credence to its 
potential successful translation as a reasoned principle for the composition of hybrid courts.62   
 
In Canada, the Supreme Court Act 1985 guarantees at least three (of nine) positions on the 
Bench to individuals from Quebec.63 These seats are only eligible for current members of the 
Quebec bar or Quebec superior courts.64 By convention the other six positions are also 
divided, albeit less rigidly, amongst the provinces.65 In Belgium, the Constitutional Court is 
composed of twelve judges equally divided between two linguistic groups of ‘six Dutch-
speaking judges…and six French-speaking judges’. In addition, one of the 12 judges must 
have an adequate knowledge of German. Each linguistic group selects a President66 and ‘the 
Presidency of the court as a whole alternates between these two each year’.67 Further, in line 
with its ‘transformative constitutional philosophy’68 the South African Constitution expressly 
directs the President to consider the ‘need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and 
gender composition of South Africa’ when appointing Judges.69 The particular arrangement 
in Canada, Belgium and South Africa is predicated on the necessity of accommodating the 
diverse interests within each society. A court that did not adequately reflect Dutch-speaking 
Belgians, civil law Québécois or black Africans would (and in the case of South Africa, 
did)70 lack authority and legitimacy within those communities.  
 
The same is true for the United Kingdom (UK). In the UK, by convention at least one judge 
from Scotland and one from Northern Ireland always sat on the House of Lords, the former 
ultimate appellate court.71 The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, the successor to the 
House of Lords, appears to operate under a similar convention. Australia has also flirted with 
the idea of requiring a geographic balance in its ultimate court. During the Convention 
Debates in Australia, it was suggested that the puisne justices of the High Court might be 
composed of the Chief Justices of the various states.72 While the chief proponent of this 
																																								 																				
61 Shetreet, supra note 32, at 311.  
62 Note that each judiciary is a creature of institutional context and care should be taken not to engage in 
unconscious translation. This section aims simply to identify that the principle of fair reflection is accepted in a 
range of domestic (and supranational) courts.  
63 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, s 6. 
64 Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6 [2014] SCC 21. 
65 Three are selected from Ontario, two from the western provinces, and one from the Atlantic Provinces: 
Shetreet, supra note 32, at 311. 
66 Special Act of 6 January 1989 on the Constitutional Court, arts 31, 34.4, 33. 
67 V. Comella, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values: A European Perspective (2009), 45.  
68 Minister of Finance and Other v. Van Heerden [2004] 6 SA 121 (Constitutional Court) 48 [81] (Mokgoro J); 
84 [142] (Sachs J); South African Police Service v. Solidarity obo Barnard [2014] ZACC 23 (2 September 
2014) [29] Moseneke ACJ). 
69 South African Constitution, s 174(2). 
70 In 1994 of the 166 Superior Court Judges in South Africa, 161 were white males: See R. Cowan, ‘Women’s 
Representation on the Courts in the Republic of South Africa’ (2006) 6 University of Maryland Journal of Race, 
Religion, Gender & Class 291, 298. 
71 Shetreet, supra note 32, at 311. 
72 Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne (28 January 1898) 265 
(Patrick Glynn).  
measure predicated his argument on: (1) financial savings; (2) judicial efficiency; and (3) a 
lack of faith that the Court would be used,73 a close reading indicates that underlying the 
proposal was the idea that to be legitimate, the Court must be reflective of the constituent 
parts of the nation. This proposal was ultimately defeated on, inter alia, partiality grounds, 
with concern that it may ‘lead to the suspicion that the Chief Justices chosen from the various 
states were intended to be in some sort of way the representatives of provincial interests’.74  
 
While this concern reverberates heavily in the literature on mixed composition of hybrid 
criminal courts,75 the discussion above has illustrated that a mild form of the principle of fair 
reflection can accommodate diverse interests without compromising the efficacy of the 
institution in domestic contexts. Properly structured and with appropriate safeguards, there is 
no reason why this could not be the case in hybrid criminal courts. Of course, the ECCC’s 
experience suggests that this can be very difficult to achieve and perhaps may be impossible 
in some cases. However, generally speaking, these are issues of implementation, not 
conception. Where serious questions surround the independence and impartiality of a state’s 
judiciary, policy makers should establish measures designed to strengthen these critical 
judicial qualities. If this proves impossible then the principle of fair reflection should cede to 
other considerations: biased or partial judges will not strengthen the legitimacy of the court, 
notwithstanding that they happen to have a connection to the local community.  
 
Significantly, the principle of fair reflection is not anathema to the international order; all 
supranational courts impose various nationality qualifications on appointment. For example, 
the European Court of Justice is composed of ‘one judge per Member State’,76 by convention 
seats on the African Court on Human and People’s Rights and the International Court of 
Justice are divided between geographic regions,77 and, in the ICJ, states who do not have a 
national sitting on the court, may nominate a national to hear a case concerning them.78 As 
the extensive literature on domestic courts suggests, public confidence and accompanying 
sociological legitimacy demand that judges of a court reflect the society or community from 
which they are drawn—all that has changed in the international criminal law forum is the 
boundaries of society. The next section will explore these enlarged boundaries. 
 
  
3. The dualism of international crimes 
 
The CAR has experienced ‘serious and unabated violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law’ which ‘are committed in a climate of total impunity’.79 Government 
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estimates suggest that in 2014 up to 44.5% of the population have suffered sexual violence.80 
Across the border in South Sudan, the UN is concerned that while the intensity of fighting 
has decreased the ‘conflict may be spreading to previously-less affected States.’81 In the 
DRC, ‘serious human rights violations continue[] to be committed by [both] armed groups 
and state agents’.82 Are these matters for domestic or international prosecutors? The question 
of international participation is a vexed one. What is it about a particular crime that triggers 
international jurisdiction? Normatively, why does the international community have an 
interest in the prosecution and punishment of certain criminal acts, but not others? And how 
should a court designed for this purpose be composed?  
 
 
3.1. The local and the global 
 
While victim-centric dispute resolution was historically ‘the natural order for societies’, 83 the 
development of the criminal law reveals a ‘steady evolution away from the “private”, or 
individual, sphere to the “public” or societal one’.84 In England, this began with the gradual 
centralization of power under the Norman Kings, resulting in a reconceptualization of crime 
as an offence against the State, not just the individual. Social contract theorists such as 
Hobbes advanced this notion, arguing that ‘a sin is not only a transgression of a law, but also 
any contempt of the legislator’.85 This remains the dominant view today. Though civil cases 
are conducted in the names of the parties, Victim v Alleged Thief; criminal prosecutions are 
conducted in the name of the state, R v Alleged Thief. The state, as the symbolic 
representative of the community,86 has a legitimate and separate interest in the prosecution 
and punishment of violations of criminal law.  
 
The state’s interest can be conceptualized in two distinct ways. First, that public wrongs harm 
the community as a whole; and second, as Antony Duff has argued, that public wrongs define 
our responsibilities as rational agents to our fellow citizens.87 Under the former notion, we 
could argue that ‘a crime is not committed only against the victim, but primarily against the 
community whose law is violated’.88 Under the latter we might say that those who commit 
crimes are answerable to the entire polity for their actions, rather than simply to their victims. 
At the domestic level the result is the same—the community has a legitimate interest in 
punishment. For example, the government of the CAR is properly regarded as the authority 
responsible for prosecuting and punishing individuals who commit criminal acts on its 
territory. Difficulties arise, however, where the criminal conduct is said to affect two 
communities—the local and the global.89  
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Five primary theoretical bases for the triggering of international interest can be discerned 
from the literature. First, that the nature and gravity of the crimes ‘deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity’90 by violating norms and values considered important to the 
international community.91 Second, that in their scale, these crimes can ‘threaten the peace, 
security, and well-being of the world’,92 and therefore must be dealt with collectively. Third, 
that international crimes capture the particular evil that is the abuse of state power to harm, 
rather than to protect.93 Fourth, that international crimes are directed at groups, and ‘all 
human beings share an interest in ensuring that people are not killed…solely because of their 
group affiliation’.94 And fifth, ontologically, that in their assault on human dignity these 
crimes negate the very nature of humaneness.95 These bases are not freestanding pillars but 
rather interact and complement each other, and may be emphasized to varying degrees 
depending on the particular context. Certainly the situations in the CAR, South Sudan and the 
DRC appear to involve all five moral bases.  
 
But if such serious crimes are ‘of concern to the international community as a whole’,96 
should prosecution be ‘confiscated’ by a particular state, just because it is the one in which 
the crime was committed?97 Leaving to one-side (significant) issues of practicality, efficacy 
and domestic legacy, should an international criminal court generally (and the ICC 
specifically) prosecute all ‘international’ crimes? Is there scope for national judges?  
 
This question can be answered by distilling two discourses of international criminal justice.98 
Robert Sloan has noted that the ‘prevailing paradigm’ approaches international criminal law 
as a form of proxy justice for the interests of disenfranchised primary victims.99 
Complementarity under the Rome Statute accords with this view,100 operating as a 
presumption in favour of national prosecutions and relegating the ICC to a mechanism 
designed to simply ‘fill the gap created by the failure of States’.101 International criminal law 
is simply an adjunct to domestic law, necessary because of unfortunate political realities. The 
second approach emphasizes the interests of a ‘figurative international community’, both in 
the sense of the values shared by a common humanity and the values shared by a community 
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of states.102 The five bases for the triggering of international interest rest on these two senses 
of Sloan’s figurative international community. While the first, fourth and fifth appear to rest 
on ideas centring on a universal humanity, the second and third are suggestive of an 
international community of states.  
 
Sloan argues that the nature and structure of international criminal tribunals will invariably 
(and should) prioritize the interests of the symbolic international community that they 
represent. International criminal courts derive their normative authority from ‘the concerted 
action of states’ through either Chapter VII of the UN Charter or multilateral treaties, not 
through any Hobbesian social contract by an affected community.103 In a recent paper, Milan 
Markovic has drawn on Sloan to argue that judges at the ICC and other international criminal 
tribunals that preside over trials concerning crimes committed by or against their fellow 
nationals should recuse themselves.104 Markovic is concerned about apprehensions of bias 
and questions whether judges can truly act as representatives of the international community 
in those circumstances.  
 
Sloan and Markovic do note that hybrid tribunals are ‘analytically distinct’,105 as they are 
established via state consent106 and are often constituted as domestic courts. The ECCC for 
example is a domestic Court, established under domestic law following agreement between 
Cambodia and the international community.107 The memorandum between the government of 
the CAR and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission required 
the CAR to ‘establish, by [domestic] law, a special criminal court’.108 Legislation to establish 
a Specialized Mixed Chambers in the DRC is before the Parliament of the DRC. Those 
Chambers too will be domestic. As such, there is more scope for the taking into account of 
national interests. However, as the previous section demonstrated, sociological legitimacy 
requires that judges reflect the community over which they exercise jurisdiction. A focus on 
the legal legitimacy of international criminal courts fundamentally misses the point. The 
crucial aspect is the dual nature of international crimes. 
 
International crimes are properly understood as both international and local crimes. The 
‘extraordinary evil’ that is genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, are not simply 
an assault on the international community at large or the international order, but also 
principally a direct attack on the local society.109 This twin-quality can be considered by 
transposing conceptions of individual victimhood in domestic jurisdictions, in order to 
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distinguish between primary or direct victims, and secondary or indirect victims. A primary 
victim is a person who is injured or dies as a direct result of an act of violence. A secondary 
victim is a person who is injured as a direct result of witnessing the act of violence that 
resulted in the injury or death of the primary victim of that act. Under this approach, the local 
society that directly suffers the atrocity can be considered the primary victim, while the 
international community—either as an international community of states or a figurative 
cosmopolitan community—who witnesses the mass violence, is considered a secondary 
victim. The international community is a victim of the act of violence not because “we” 
directly suffered physical or psychological abuse, but because one of the five theoretical 
bases for the triggering of international interest has been met.  
 
In moving towards a principled justification for mixed composition courts it is not necessary 
to, a priori, adopt a particular theoretical basis for international participation to the exclusion 
of all others. This is the case for two reasons. First, as noted above, separating these bases is 
akin to splitting hairs and some may be more relevant than others. Second, each basis leads to 
the same principled conclusion for mixed composition—that is, wherever, for example, the 
nature, scale and gravity of criminal action violates norms and values considered important to 
the international community or assaults human dignity so to negate the very nature of 
humanness, international participation is likely justified—though valid (and not so valid) 
competing considerations may caution against it.  
 
Nevertheless, in each instance it remains important to accurately identify the basis claimed, 
for this will affect the institutional response. For example, the assassination of Prime Minister 
Rafic Hariri led to the creation of the Special Tribunal of Lebanon. Why? Of course 
pragmatic reasons connected to Lebanon's situation were important, but significantly, the 
understanding that this assassination 'threaten[ed] peace and security not only in the region, 
but throughout the world'110 grounded international involvement on the second theoretical 
basis, notwithstanding that this was—ordinarily—a purely domestic matter,111 and unlikely to 
meet any severity threshold. On the same point the genocide against Rohingya Muslims in 
Burma112 clearly gives rise to international involvement on the first, second, fourth and fifth 
theoretical bases and, as such, an international court to try those responsible could be 
established. However, unless and until the consequences of this heinous crime cross the 
Bangladesh or Thai border, it is unlikely to threaten international peace and security, and the 
second basis is unavailable as grounding. Unfortunately, despite already possessing a clear 
principled basis for international involvement, realpolitik prevents action. 
 
Assuming any of the bases are satisfied, as the primary victim of these dual crimes the local 
community has a special interest in seeing the perpetrators prosecuted. But, importantly, the 
international community still has a general interest in seeing such a trial. The principle of fair 
reflection suggests that institutional and sociological legitimacy requires that both 
international and local judges adjudicate these crimes. Of course, states can choose to 
prosecute these crimes internally or domestically – and historically they have done so113 – but 
in principle, and in order to reflect the characteristic of crimes that trigger international 
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interest, these prosecutions should involve a mix of international and local components.114 
This idea is drawn from Frédéric Mégret’s representational theory of international criminal 
justice, which offers a cogent defence of hybrid tribunals as the particular adjudicative 
mechanism that best encapsulates the particular characteristic of international crimes.115 
However Mégret’s theory is only a step on the way to a principled justification for the extent 
of internationalization.  
 
 
3.2. Hybrid courts and international crimes 
 
Evoking Hanna Pitkin’s work on representation, Mégret contends that ‘persons tried for 
international crimes should be tried by tribunals that adequately “represent” the nature of the 
crimes at stake’.116 While there is nothing strictly international about Mégret’s theory—a 
person alleged to have breached domestic national security laws should be tried by a 
domestic court because that court best “represents” the nature of the crime—it is compelling 
in the international criminal justice field because of the peculiar characteristic of the criminal 
activity.  
 
Although not directly referring to it, it is clear that Mégret is using representation in the 
symbolic sense of “standing for”.117 In this dimension the hybrid tribunal, with its mixed 
composition and mixed material jurisdiction, is, in the words of Susanne Langer, a vehicle for 
the conception of the dual communities.118 It is ‘an exact reference to something 
indefinite’.119 ‘The great merit of hybrid tribunals’, Mégret notes, is that institutionally they 
‘deal with the artificial distinction between the domestic and international by simply 
collapsing it’.120 Rather than risk ignoring a core dimension of an individual’s crime—either 
the international or domestic element—hybrid tribunals ‘mould themselves into the shape of 
the crimes they are judging’.121 Both societies—the local and the global—are represented in 
the adjudicative mechanism. On this conception, hybrid tribunals are no longer a second-best 
option122 but a principled and justifiable response to mass-atrocity.  
 
Unfortunately, despite Mégret’s optimistic assertion that hybrid tribunals collapse the 
distinction between the international and domestic, the two spheres still exist: judges and 
lawyers are deliberately selected from both communities, and the accused will be subject to 
domestic and international law. Physical and social barriers (e.g. language, culture, pay 
differentials) between the international staff and the local population often amplify this 
recurrent structural differentiation, and result in de facto segregation.123 Perhaps more 
disconcertingly from a functional perspective, these same barriers operate at the institutional 
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level: for example, first-hand accounts at the ECCC suggest that linguistic barriers have 
hampered genuine discussion and debate between international and local staff.  
 
This is not an oversight. Mégret’s theory does not intend to flesh out a principled case for the 
extent of internationalization. In some respects his theory is a threshold inquiry to a critical 
problem: It is one thing to agree that hybrid tribunals best represent the particular crimes at 
stake in international criminal justice, but it is another to determine the modalities of that 
internationalization. In the next part, I seek to answer this second question: If the principle of 
fair reflection requires that international crimes be adjudicated by local and international 




3.3. A majority of international or local judges? 
 
Delineating the composition of all future hybrid tribunals is, of course, unhelpful. Rather, this 
section will provide a principled rebuttable presumption from which policy makers can begin 
with. It is to be remembered that the peculiar context of each situation must be the overriding 
concern of those tasked with designing and implementing hybrid tribunals. In this sense, 
issues to be aware of include: the nature of the crimes, the independence of the local 
judiciary, and the phase of the state’s rebuilding. In practice, these factors may tend towards a 
different composition. What follows therefore, is necessarily somewhat abstract.  
 
Despite the slightly distinct philosophical grounding of each moral justification for 
international involvement, at the core of each basis is an element of extreme severity. It is this 
severity that re-conceptualizes a purely local crime into a crime of international concern. 
Severity can be understood in a number of ways. It can refer to the systemic nature of 
violations either temporally or geographically, the scale of the violations, the seriousness or 
intensity of those violations and their likelihood to reverberate beyond state boundaries, their 
impact on victims, or the manner in which they were committed.124 For Luban, it brings to 
mind ‘something extraordinary’, a ‘cataclysm’ beyond the ‘normal part of the daily 
functioning of government’.125 In this regard, justification is self-evident, ‘it just feels 
right’.126 
 
The concept itself is indistinct, purposely so.127 Yet it conjures up recognizable imagery. 
Once a specific crime or pattern of criminal activity crosses this threshold, in principle, it 
should be properly regarded as ‘not the concern of one state alone,’128 but ‘the business of all 
of us’.129 This approach is not morally subjective but its precise contours are difficult to 
discern—and it is likely that a principled case for international involvement cannot be made 
until at least two or three of the five theoretical bases are satisfied.130 Of course, as noted 
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above, realpolitik and selective enforcement often acts to prevent legitimate and principled 
opportunities for international involvement. This simply means that even if an act qualifies, 
international involvement does not necessarily follow.   
 
Indeed, unlike the international human rights regime, the concept (as opposed to the all-too-
selective enforcement) of international criminal law is not subject to the same critiques of 
Western imperialism.131 This is unsurprising: the Geneva Conventions have been ratified by 
196 states, including all UN member states, both UN observer states, as well as the Cook 
Islands, and scholars and jurists have emphasized that all major cultural and religious 
traditions prohibit these crimes.132 In Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion,133 Judge Weeramantry’s dissenting opinion explored this relationship: 
 
 It greatly strengthens the concept of humanitarian laws of war to note that this is not a 
recent invention, nor the product of any one culture. The concept is of ancient origin, 
with a lineage stretching back at least three millennia. As already observed, it is deep-
rooted in many cultures – Hindu, Buddhist, Chinese, Christian, Islamic and traditional 
African.134 
 
That the severity of a criminal act makes it a crime of universal concern is reflected in the 
emergence of universal jurisdiction. Under this concept certain crimes, because of their very 
nature, do not require a jurisdictional nexus to a particular state. Instead, any state may 
exercise jurisdiction, and in doing so, ‘acts on behalf of the international 
community…because it has an interest in the preservation of world order as a member of that 
community.’135 The classic example is that of piracy—although this crime may rise to the 
level of international concern for instrumental reasons. Even ‘before International Law in the 
modem sense of the term was in existence, a pirate was already considered an outlaw, a 
“hostis humani generis,”’ an enemy of all mankind. Today this notion is codified in the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,136 and actualized through the UN Office of Drugs and 
Crime ‘Maritime Crime Program’. 
 
That the subject matter of international criminal law under the Rome Statute is restricted to 
jus cogens crimes is significant. As is the episodic exercise of universal jurisdiction. Both 
reinforce and explicitly endorse these crimes as a universal moral concern. Questions of 
appropriate theories of punishment, the utility of transposing municipal concepts into the 
international sphere, and effectiveness of specific criminal mechanisms are secondary issues. 
In these cases, for these crimes, “humanity” at large is denoted the primary community, 
rather than any particular political community of humans. In this respect, the international 
community should bear a greater role and responsibility in any trial. In principle therefore, 
hybrid courts should be staffed by a majority of international judges. 
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Of course, “a majority” does not mean an overwhelming majority. International crimes quite 
clearly have a more pronounced impact on local communities than the diffuse international 
community. It is impossible to argue persuasively that the systematic use of rape as an 
instrument of genocide in Rwanda harmed a broadly defined humanity more than the 
Rwandan community. This would suggest that local judges should predominate. However, it 
ignores the important normative effect of grounding these crimes as crimes of international 
concern. If we take Antony Duff’s conception of crime as responsibility,137 a majority of 
international judges can both reflect and affirm the international polity. Those who commit 
crimes that cross the severity threshold should be answerable to the international community 
for their actions. The particular theory of criminal justice one chooses to prioritize does not 
necessarily affect this conclusion. While I acknowledge that on a purely restorative model a 
majority of local judges (if judges at all) may be preferred, an individual convicted of 
committing an international crime has still victimized two communities, and must repair the 
harm caused to both.138  
 
This principled approach is supported by pragmatic reasons. First, it is likely that there will 
be a greater number of international judges with expertise in the subject matter of the hybrid 
court than local judges. Second, majority international involvement also carries symbolic 
weight, demonstrating international commitment to the victims of mass atrocity. Third, a 
majority of international judges may weaken allegations of victor’s justice. And fourth, it is 
impossible to avoid the likelihood that a transitioning state’s judiciary will not be sufficiently 
independent from executive influences. In these circumstances majority international 
involvement may enhance the legitimacy of the court in the eyes of the people of the affected 
state. Nevertheless, quite apart from anxiety about the capacity of an affected State’s 
judiciary, in their representative character, hybrid courts should in principle be composed of a 
majority of international judges. This composition more accurately reflects the core element 
of the triggering of international concern—extreme severity of criminal activity: either in 
affecting the international community of states, or a common humanity.    
 
Nevertheless, this principle should properly be regarded as only a rebuttable presumption. In 
particular contexts there may be valid reasons to moderate the exact composition. For 
example, where the severity of the alleged criminal acts does not reach a sufficient gravity, 
the interests of the international community may not be sufficiently engaged to justify a 
majority of international judges. Furthermore, in the course of a hybrid court’s operation it 
may make practical or political sense to transition to a majority of national judges.139 This 
shift would be in recognition of a transition in political ownership to the affected state.140 As 
the Special Criminal Court, for example, becomes a politically and sociologically legitimate 
feature in the CAR it may make sense to reflect the changed dynamics.141 This gradual phase-
out of international judges could be combined with the establishment of an independent 
judicial commission managing the selection of local judges and prosecutors across the CAR 
or other embedded rule of law capacity building institutions. Assuming such appropriate 
safeguards are introduced, as Section II demonstrated, it would likely increase the courts 
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legitimacy in the eyes of Central Africans.142 It would also present an opportunity for the 
international community to gradually withdraw from the Court.143 It is to be remembered that 
hybrid courts are not meant to be enduring. They are a limited mechanism operating on a 





The operation of international criminal tribunals ‘often entails serious legitimacy 
challenges’.144 This paper has argued that the principle of fair reflection can offer a cogent 
defence for mixed composition of hybrid courts potentially enhancing legitimacy, and leading 
to better outcomes for the local community. It has also argued that the peculiar character of 
international crimes necessitates both international and local involvement in the trial of 
alleged perpetrators. That we sit on the cusp of a new generation of hybrid international 
criminal justice, suggests that this is a lesson that is, at least subconsciously, understood.  
 
This is not a radical proposal. In 1474, Sir Peter von Hagenbach was accused of ‘trampl[ing] 
under foot the laws of God and man’ for atrocities committed during the occupation of 
Breisach. In what is widely accepted as the start-point of international criminal justice,145 von 
Hagenbach was brought before an ad hoc tribunal composed of 28 judges: 
 
Eight of [the judges] were nominated by Breisach, and two by each of the other allied 
Alsatian and Upper Rhenanian towns [Strasbourg, Selestat, Colmar, Basel, Thann, 
Kenzingen, Neuburg am Rhein, and Freiburg im Breisgau], Berne, a member of the 
Swiss Confederation, and Solothurn, allied with Berne.146 
 
The local community, Breisach, nominated a plurality of judges, with the majority being 
nominated by the international community of states.  
 
In international criminal law’s quest for legitimacy it may seem odd to return to a time before 
the birth of international law. However, much of the concern surrounding international 
criminal justice is its alienation from the primary victims. For too long international justice 
has been ‘justice divorced from local realities’.147 International criminal law’s challenge is to 
make justice available on a personal level. The principle of fair reflection can provide 
significant insight to the composition of hybrid criminal courts by focusing attention on 
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